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building permit denial was arbitrary and capricious. The appellate
court found that Higgins' proper remedy was to challenge the
building inspector's action through a CPLR article 78 proceeding, and,
thus, converted the action to the proper proceeding.
Makayla A. Shannon
LaSala v. Terstiege, 713 N.Y.S.2d 767 (N.Y. App. Div. 2000) (holding
the Town of Babylon failed to meet the burden of proof to establish
good title to land situated under the water of Great Neck Creek).
The Town of Babylon ("Town") appealed an order from the
Supreme Court of New York, Suffolk County granting Anthony
LaSala's motion for summary judgment. The Town also appealed the
same court's order dismissing the Town's counterclaim regarding title
to land situated under the water of the Great Neck Creek ("Land").
LaSala originally brought the action to quiet title to the Land. In
order for the Town to prevail, it was required to show possession and
good title, and, according to Real Property and Proceedings Law
("RPAPL") article 15, could not rely on the weakness of the LaSala's
title, to prevail. The Town asserted it possessed superior title to the
Land based on grants issued by Colonial governors in 1666, 1688, and
1694. The Town also asserted no conveyance to an individual existed.
The earlier conveyances granted the Town title to all land lying under
tidewaters. Therefore, the Town needed to prove Great Neck Creek
was defined as tidewater.
LaSala provided the court with an unbroken chain of title dating
back to 1831. Each conveyance granted title to land "bounded on the
east by Great Neck Creek" or "with title running to the center of Great
Neck Creek."
The court stated the Town failed to show Great Neck Creek was
considered tidewater. Therefore, the Town failed to meet its burden
of proof. The court further asserted LaSala's title fell within the scope
of an earlier holding. The previous court found, in the absence of
express language in the conveyance, the title to a non-tidal stream is
presumed to extend to the center of that stream.
The court, in reviewing all documents and evidence, determined
the supreme court properly granted LaSala's motion for summary
judgment, and validated LaSala's title to the Land.
Lynne Stadjuhar
Water Auth. of W. Nassau County v. Lockheed Martin Corp., 714
N.Y.S.2d 726 (N.Y. App. Div. 2000) (holding the statute of limitations
barred the civil action instituted by the Water Authority of Western
Nassau County for damages to real property caused by ground water
contamination).

